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Abstract - We educe a perspective on how best to regulate the bank of tomorrow 
in frames of debate launched by the International Centre for Financial Regulation and 
Financial Times. Our goal is to create a conceptual framework for policymakers and 
regulators to shape the international financial system in century of globalization using 
the 1888 FT’s motto: “Without fear and without favour.” Our prospect employs an 
analytical approach, which focuses on the origins and evolution of banking system, its 
transformation over the recent decades, subsequent encountering the limits to growth 
and redefinition of new strategic boundaries of emerging financial industry. We 
identify the main reasons and limitations, which led to the global financial crisis. We 
propose the new research agendas with the aim to understand the situation in finances, 
evaluate the created systemic damages, and find the possible ways to resolve the 
existing problems through introduction of new banking regulation. We think that the 
global economic and financial systems are highly nonlinear systems. In our opinion, the 
frequency, phase and amplitude modulation during the mixing of waves, which 
characterize the Kitchin, Juglar, Kuznets, Kondratiev economic cycles, may result in 
origination of strong nonlinear dynamics in financial system, accompanied by chaos-
induced phenomena. These nonlinear effects have to be taken to the account, when 
adding the liquidity to the financial system in small quantas in series over time period 
during the Quantitative Easing policy execution by central banks. We propose the 
Random Tax to be selectively imposed on the profits, obtained by market agents during 
high-risk high-profit speculative transactions. We expect that the Random Tax will 
stabilize the financial system in conditions of free market capitalism. We conclude by 
outlining a new set of policies to regulate the financial system toward its sustainable 
development in harmony with global society and planetary ecosystem. 
 
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb 
 For many centuries, people were dreaming about finding the perfect solutions 
for imperfect problems, which they are about to face in real World. Considering the 
evolution of financial industry over the resent decades, one question may arise in 
Gavetti, Rivkin (2007): Where does a bank’s competitive strategy come from? It is 
obvious that the wisdom of policy makers in creation of banking regulation and 
monetary policies as well as the skills and experiences by bankers in search for virtuous 
strategies toward the profitable and sustainable bank operation, and many other internal 
and external (to the financial industry) factors and forces may have a great impact on 
the origin of bank’s competitive strategy in given economic conditions. Despite of 
considerable progress in innovation introduction in financial industry over the recent 
years, our global society remains weak in search of meaningful answer to a set of 
straightforward questions: Why did the present monetary policies lead the financial 
industry to the crisis? How would it be possible for the systemic regulators to resolve 
the existing problems and avoid the repetition of up and down cycles in financial 
industry in the future? How can the financial industry continue to serve the interests of 
investors and economic growth without putting our World at risk in Chaney, Goodhart, 
Webb (2009)? 
 
Let us go back to basics and try to understand the right meanings of definitions 
and terminology used in the field of finances in Hirsch (1896): “The primary object of 
a Bank is the purchase of debts with its own credit. Credit is the exchange of existing 
commodities at a future date, which later may already be in existence, or may be 
produced in the future. The economic object of credit is to enable producers to obtain 
capital. Capital comprises all wealth produced for the ultimate purpose of satisfying 
some want or desire, but actually employed in adding to the productiveness of future 
labor. Every transfer of capital on credit creates a Debt, i.e. a legal right to other 
commodities at a future date.” 
In general, the bank is a maturity and risk transforming institution in Sargent 
(2010). There are two investment strategies used by banks presently in Flassbeck 
(2009): 
1) To invest with the goal to build the productive capacities; 
2) To invest in the Structured Investment Vehicles with the aim to trade the 
derivatives in financial and/or equity markets. 
The Structured Investment Vehicles are extremely complex. The purpose of 
structured credit products is to give fixed income investors fully rated and leveraged 
exposure to the main Credit Derivatives Indices. Investment Portfolio building with 
positions hedged by different means depends on investor’s expertise in the following 
investment vehicles: 
1. Credit Derivatives (CD are the financial contracts whose payoffs explicitly 
depend on the behaviour of one or more indices): Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO), Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDO), and investment protection 
mechanisms such as the Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (SCDO), Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS), Credit Default Swap Index (CDSI), Loan only Credit Default 
Swaps (LCDS), Credit Default Swaps of ABS (ABCDS), Variance Swaps (VS), 
Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI), Contracts for Difference (CFD) 
2. Equity Derivatives: Futures, Asian Options, Barrier Options, Compound 
Options, Look-back Options, Vanilla Stock Options (put and call options), Vix Options 
3. Other Derivatives: Interest Rate Swaps 
Both investment strategies assume the application of modern Risk Management 
practices to mitigate the risk. In general, the risk management is based on the principles 
of diversification, hedging and risk measurements. The actual risk is measured using 
the concepts of the Economic Capital and the Credit Modeling: 
1. Cost of Capital is calculated using the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) model, which includes the following financial variables and ratios: Levered 
Beta, Debt/Total Capitalization, Tax Rate, Unlevered Beta, Targeted Capital Structure, 
Risk Free Rate, Market Risk Premium, Spread over Risk Free Rate. 
2. Cost of Equity is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), which includes the following financial variables and ratios: Beta = Firm 
Specific Risk / Market Risk, Cost of Equity = Risk Free Rate + Beta, Multifactor Models 
of Asset Returns. In CAPM theory, beta is a measure of risk: a measure of stock price 
volatility relative to the overall benchmark market index. Beta changes from 0 to 2 
(beta=0, risk=0; beta=1, then risk=average market risk (a stock moves up or down in the 
same proportion as the overall market); beta=2, then risk=well above average market 
risk). 
3. Monte Carlo computer simulation techniques are used to generate 
scenarios, and statistical tools to analyze the results. 
The four main categories of risks, considered by banks, are in Bernanke (2009): 
1. Market Risk; 
2. Credit Risk; 
3. Operational Risk; 
4. Rollover Risk 
Other categories of risks may include the transaction risk, foreign exchange 
risk, reputation risk, emerging markets risk, environmental risk, geopolitical risk, etc. 
The quantitative techniques such as the Option Pricing, Delta Hedging and Value at 
Risk are widespread tools for the risk management within financial institutions. 
Evaluation of the risk of investment projects is based on the concept of calculation of 
the Net Present Value (NPV). The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
model was proposed for statistical modeling of volatility in Engle (2007). However, 
these techniques could induce similar trading patterns among banks exposed to external 
influences, and increase systemic risk of multiple failures of financial institutions 
Barber (2008). Some economists argued that the financial institutions will never have a 
perfect risk management model in Greenspan (2008, 2007). The reason for this way of 
thinking is grounded on the perceptions that the risk is in Kay (2009): 
1) Subjective expected utility; 
2) Uncertainty. 
In our opinion, the risk is different from the uncertainty, which can not be controlled or 
measured, during the risk management at financial institutions in Kay (2009). 
In 2006, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision introduced the Basel II 
accord, which is a risk-based capital adequacy project with clearly specified minimum 
regulatory capital requirements for credit risk management by banks in Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). 
 
The financial system is an integral part of market economy. Having discussed 
the definition of terms and modern practices in finances, let us concentrate on the 
theoretical definition of business cycle in market economy, and then, think about: How 
can the business cycle impact the financial system? The time dependence of real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) usually consists of the fluctuations under the long term 
growth period. The expression ∆G(i) = ∆G(i) - ∆G(i-1) commonly shows the cycle, 
which is repeating depression and prosperity, is called ‘‘business cycle’’ in Taniguchi, 
Bando, Nakayama (2008). Such business cycle may be characterized into several types 
according to its period: the 3 – 7 year Kitchin inventory cycle, the 7 –11 year Juglar 
fixed investment cycle, the 15 – 25 year Kuznets infrastructural investment cycle in 
Kuznets (1973) and the 45 – 60 Kondratieff long wave cycle in Kondratieff (1935). The 
origin of any business cycle can be caused by many external and internal sources. 
Business cycles cause significant variations of economic variables and indices. 
 
Now, let us consider the present state of matters in finances, analyze the reasons 
of functional failure of financial system and drive conclusions to create a conceptual 
framework for policymakers and regulators to shape the financial industry in a century 
of globalization. 
The present business cycle is characterized by severe crisis in finances, because 
of a number of reasons. First of all, it is a systemic crisis, which makes it so different 
from the previous recessions. The root of crisis is a complete failure of essentially 
wrong ideas and invalid assumptions on how to govern the global economy and 
finances in conditions of capitalism, which took over the minds of policymakers. The 
prevailing opinion was that in Begg (1982) and in Skidelsky (2009): 
1) Markets are efficient; 
2) Shares are priced correctly; 
3) Demand and Supply of goods and services are well balanced by market itself. 
These ideas and assumptions provided a foundation for the so-called 
Monetarism theory, which was developed and supported by monetarists from Chicago 
school of economics in Friedman (1967), Stigler (1971), Hayek (1980), and had a 
primary influence on Anglo-American economic and financial policies since 1970s in 
Skidelsky (2009). The Austrian school of economic thought, founded by Carl Menger, 
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Ludwig von Mises and further developed by Henry 
Hazlitt, Friedrich Hayek and Murray Rothbard, who advocated for the strict 
enforcement of voluntary contractual agreements and inadmissibility of application of 
coercive forces on transactions between free market agents in Menger (1871), von 
Böhm-Bawerk (1884–1921), von Mises (1940–1949), Hazlitt (1946), Hayek (1948), 
Rothbard (1962), became a main source of inspiration for the Monetarism theory 
advocates. However, the  Neoclassical Price Theory and free market libertarianism 
postulates are very controversial and some economists argued about their validity, for 
example the idea that “the markets are self correcting” is claimed to be a misperception 
in Krugman (2009). The free market forces failed in Clarke (2009): 
1. To deliver the goods; 
2. To offer self-correction; 
3. To cope with self-inflicted crisis of confidence. 
The prevailing opinion was also strongly criticized in Soros (2008): 
1. Paradigm that market tends to an equilibrium is false; 
2. Deviations from equilibrium occur in random nature; 
3. Assumption that people act rationally is not a case; 
4. Calculation of (financial) risk was based on the false paradigm. 
 
The Austrian school of economic thought came up with the Austrian business 
cycle theory, which views the business / credit cycles as a result of unwise central 
bank’s financial policies execution, which may cause the interest rates to remain very 
low for long time, resulting in excessive credit creation and expansion, misallocation of 
capital, law savings accumulation, and finally economic bubble generation in von 
Mises L (1912), Hayek F A (1931). In the Austrian economists’ opinion, the 
centralized government intervention with the help of central bank in processes of 
capital allocation in conditions of efficient market results in the business cycles 
generation. In Danny Quah’s words: “Hayek viewed business cycles as having their 
initiating impulse of central bank credit overexpansion and their propagation 
mechanism of misallocation of capital across short- and long-term investments” in 
Quah (2007). The Austrian business cycle theory was strongly criticized by John 
Maynard Keynes in 1930s, and then it was regarded as incorrect business cycle theory 
and rejected in Friedman (1969, 1993), Krugman (1998). 
Similar theory of business cycles origin, for instance as a result of speculative 
increases in the value of land, was proposed in George (1879). The introduction of wise 
taxation policies due to the shift of taxation burden from the capital and labor to the 
land value was proposed to be considered as an opportunity to avoid the long term 
recession cycles under free market capitalism in George (1879). 
The US Federal Reserve under former Fed’s Chairman Alan Greenspan in 
1987-2006 set very low interest rates for Federal Reserve funds over extended time 
period, which, in combination with quite liberal monetary base management policies, 
made the speculative increases in the value of structured investment vehicles possible, 
and to some degree, contributed to the severe recession cycle in the USA, and provided 
the grounds to validate the Hayek’s theory assumptions. 
 
In conditions of economic recession cycle, triggered by market imbalances, 
there is a serious solvency problem among the market agents, because the private sector 
incomes were not able to continue to service private sector debt in Skene (2009). It was 
soon realized that this is a most severe financial crisis since World War II in Hutton, 
Wolf (2008). The growing inequalities of opportunity and income between the free 
market agents led to the social unrests in many countries around the World. The present 
economic problems began to pose a considerable treats to the developed nations in 
Gamble, Hutton, Quah (2009). The current situation is similar to the time of Great 
Depression in the USA in Bernanke (2004). Main conclusions on origins of the 
economic downturn were derived in Soros (2009): 
1. Economic cycle has to collapse, because it was built on false premises; 
2. The bigger bust, the bigger collapse; 
3. During a crash you have a liquidation of mispriced assets. 
Most influential economists, financiers and political philosophers were in search 
for effective means to prevent the business cycles. The common modern view on 
possible resolution of presently existing problems in finances and economics is that the 
Adam Smith capitalism model, who believed that the free market's is able to establish a 
price that provides a fair return on land, labor, and capital as well as to procure the right 
amount and variety of goods and services by a so-called "invisible hand" in Smith 
(1776), has to be complemented by the John Maynard Keynes capitalism model in 
Keynes (1936). The recent action strategies by policymakers around the World are in 
good agreement with the John Maynard Keynes conjectures about the modern 
capitalism. The Keynes theory postulates and findings were presented in his well 
known research paper titled: “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money” in Keynes (1936), and are summarized in Skidelsky (2009): 
1. We don’t know nearly as much about the future as we think; 
2. When markets suffer big shocks, they don’t sell correct quickly, but start 
shrinking; 
3. Government must inject extra liquidity into economy to compensate for the 
decline in private spending; 
4. Market system is needed central management, if it is to work for everyone’s 
benefit. 
Let us consider the operation of global financial system, which is affected by 
two main problems in Rodrik (2009): 
1) Weak financial regulation and supervision; 
2) Growth of global economic imbalances. 
We begin with the explanation that the central banks in different countries 
govern the state finances through the creation of financial policies for effective 
systemic financial regulation. Also, the monetary base is created by central banks in 
Krugman (2009). The core purposes of central bank is to establish and maintain: 
1. Monetary stability, which means stable prices and confidence in the currency; 
2. Financial stability, which entails for detecting and reducing threats to the 
financial system as a whole. 
The debate on the encountered problems in financial system and possible 
remedies to fix the global financial system was initiated at all levels in global society as 
the financial crisis started to progress in conditions of global recession. The quick 
action to defuse the financial crisis was needed in Hutton, Wolf (2008). It was agreed 
that the monetary stability and financial stability have to be better maintained by the 
central banks. In addition, the critical issues to think about were formulated in Pandit 
(2009): 
1. The need for regulatory structure that will allow markets to clear up 
efficiently; 
2. The need for financial architecture that can truly optimize the global GDP 
growth; 
3. The need for a lot of global coordination. 
Let us concentrate on the two main ideas, which were proposed by many 
researchers and deserve particular attention: 
1. To strengthen the regulation in the finances and; 
2. To add liquidity in the banking system. 
The first idea is focused on the creation of effective systemic regulation for 
global financial industry. It was agreed in principle that the reputation and functional 
performance of banks have to be improved significantly. The banks have to become 
more transparent, demonstrating that their assets are of acceptable quality and offer 
sufficient margins to compensate for risk. The creation of effective systemic regulation 
for global financial industry considered the following initiatives in Blankfein (2009): 
1) To establish the fair market value for bank’s assets; 
2) To use an adequate pricing model; 
3) To adopt the fair value accounting with responsible systemic risk 
management; 
4) To raise capital requirements for banks with the goal to reduce systemic risk; 
5) To improve the underwriting standards; 
6) To take to the account all the risks and uncertainties during portfolio risks 
management; 
7) To maintain the culture of transparency and integrity in financial institutions. 
In addition, it was argued that some other regulation related measures have to be 
undertaken to increase efficiency of banking system: 
1) The introduction of different sets of regulation for the commercial banking 
and investment banking may have sense in Peyer (2009). 
2) The clear understanding of existing limitations of the Black–Scholes options 
pricing model, which postulates that the option is implicitly priced if the stock is traded 
by risk managers in investment banks is essential for the proper Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in Black, Scholes (1973) and in Merton (1973). These 
limitations may include: the tail risk, liquidity risk, volatility risk, gap risk; and have to 
be considered from position of the Collective Risk Theory in Gerber (1973) and 
Gerber, Shiu (1994, 2003). Mispricing of value of derivatives resulted in complete 
bankruptcy of Long-Term Capital Management by investment banks in Gamble, 
Hutton, Quah (2009). In addition, the understanding of limitations of Modern Portfolio 
Theory with Efficient Portfolio definition, which is one where no added diversification 
can lower the portfolio's risk for a given return expectation, will certainly be helpful in 
Markowitz (1952, 1959). 
3) The new regulation for credit-rating agencies, which were not able to 
perform their main function such as to rate the credit or price the assets of financial 
institutions correctly, and mistakenly rated many tens of thousands of structured 
investment vehicles at AAA, has to be developed in Gamble, Hutton, Quah (2009) and 
in Kay (2009). The very essence of credit rating idea has to be well understood in 
Becker, Milbourn (2009): “A credit rating is an assessment of the creditworthiness of a 
corporation or security, based on the issuer’s quality of assets, its existing liabilities, its 
borrowing and repayment history and its overall business performance. Ratings predict 
the likelihood of default on financial obligations and the expected repayment in the 
event of default. By making information about these important factors widely available, 
ratings fulfill a key function of information transmission in financial markets.” 
4) More regulation of hedge funds has to be introduced in FSA (2009) and in 
Soros (2009). 
5) The reach of clear agreement on banker’s compensation packages, bonuses 
and incentives may certainly be considered as a valuable contribution to the creation of 
effective systemic regulation for global financial industry in Gamble, Hutton, Quah 
(2009) and in Roberts (2009). 
6) A more in depth understanding of the implications of increased financial 
interdependence in a globalized world has to be developed and reflected in a new 
banking regulation in Aznar (2009). 
Reviewing all the ideas on the new proposed regulation initiatives, it is 
necessary to understand that: “What is needed is not more regulation, but better 
regulation,” in Knight (2009). 
The second idea was based on the common perception that there is a strong 
necessity to create a new monetary policy, to maintain the monetary and financial 
stabilities by adding the liquidity to the banking system with the aim to avoid a failure 
of confidence. The idea was to get the bad debt out of financial system and re-capitalize 
the banks. This policy of adding liquidity to the financial system was called the 
Quantitative Easing or Credit Easing in Bernanke (2009), and it was well supported by 
a number of financiers, who emphasized that the collapse of credit basically means that 
authorities have in Soros (2009): 
1) To re-inflate the system; 
2) To arrest the collapse of credit; 
3) To re-constitute or re-organize the system. 
During the realization of Credit Easing, the Federal Reserve focused on three 
strategies in Bernanke (2009): 
1) To provide short term liquidity to financial institutions; 
2) To serve as a source of liquidity for financial institutions in medium term; 
3) To purchase the long term securities for Federal Reserve portfolio. 
We agree with the statement that the financial markets can be characterized as 
open, non-linear and complex systems in Beinhocker (2006). We think that the 
nonlinear phenomena in the economy have to be taken to the account during the 
stimulus packages introduction by every central bank. In our opinion, the 
fluctuations of magnitudes of economic variables may become large enough to produce 
substantial nonlinear distortions during the phase transitions caused by: 
1) Transition of economy from one business cycle to another business cycle, 
which may be characterized by critical point, at which the actual transition takes place; 
2) Coupling between the business cycles: the Kitchin inventory cycle, Juglar 
fixed investment cycle, Kuznets infrastructural investment cycle and the Kondratieff 
long wave cycle. 
Let us explain our proposal in details: Every business cycle has a periodic 
nature, hence it can be represented as a wave with certain frequency of oscillation, time 
period and amplitude of oscillation in accordance with the Theory of Electromagnetic 
Field in Maxwell (1861, 1865 and 1873). We think that the mixing of business cycles 
during their interaction may lead to an appearance of the frequency, phase and 
amplitude modulation phenomenon, which, under certain conditions, may result 
in origination of strong nonlinear dynamics in financial and economic systems 
accompanied by the intermodulation distortions, phase noise and chaos. For 
example, the mixing of the Kitchin inventory cycle short wave, Juglar fixed investment 
cycle short wave, Kuznets infrastructural investment cycle medium wave with 
Kondratieff long wave may produce, under certain conditions, the intermodulation 
distortions resulting in nonlinear dynamics in global financial system. For instance, the 
random shift of phase of modulated wave during the mixing of Kuznets infrastructural 
investment cycle medium wave with Kondratieff long wave may generate the phase 
noise. In addition, the changing degree of entropy of financial/economic system, which 
is defined by financial/economic variables and ratios described early, may generate the 
different kinds of nonlinearities and chaos in finances in Mosekilde (1996). Therefore, 
the nonlinear dynamics has to be taken to account during both the probabilities 
computing in risk management methodologies in finances and the introduction of 
stimulus packages by central banks into financial system, which, in some cases, may 
even be affected by the so called Butterfly effect: sensitive dependence of financial 
system on initial conditions in Lorenz (1963, 1964) and Gleick (1987). 
We propose the idea that, during the implementation of Quantitative 
Easing policy by the Federal Reserve in the US or by Bank of England in the UK, 
the liquidity has to be added to the financial system by small quantas (in small 
quantities, parts or steps) in series over time period, in analogy with quantum 
physics in Feynman (1962, 1965). Every time, the decision about the adding of extra 
quanta of liquidity to the financial system by central bank must be based on the 
analysis of obtained product of reaction of negative/positive feedback loop, existing in 
financial system, during the extended periods of market disequilibrium. The 
expectation to solve the crisis in finances with the addition of big extra liquidity 
packages to the financial system promptly, as it was done by Federal Reserve and 
approved by Congress in the USA in 2009, may lead to the inefficient allocation of 
capital among the banks, which may pursue the short term investment strategies to 
invest all the extra liquidity resources in the Structured Investment Vehicles or to 
speculate on the foreign exchange money markets with the aim to get extra profit from 
speculation. These big profits, made by some of Wall Street’s leading banks, are 
labeled as the “hidden gifts” from the state in Soros (2009) and in Freeland (2009). 
Therefore, we suggest encouraging banks to pursue the long term investment strategies 
in productive capacities. It can be done with the introduction of a new tax. We propose 
to introduce the Random Tax, which must be imposed on the profits obtained by 
market agents as a result of their random decisions to pursue and complete the 
high-risk high-profit transactions, which, as a side effect, tend to increase the 
volatility and destabilize the free market. The basic idea is that the Tax authorities 
will encourage and/or coerce all the market agents (banks, investment firms and hedge 
funds) to act responsibly and creatively rather than irresponsibly and destructively, 
when conducting the transactions in the free market, by selecting the market agents, 
which engaged in high profit speculative transactions (these events are random) and by 
imposing the Random Tax on the profits obtained during these transactions. The 
Random Tax will certainly complement the present taxation regulation, stabilize the 
free market, improve the generally accepted free market rules and turn the free market 
to a better place to make business. 
Similar idea was to introduce a global tax on financial transactions: “Tobin tax” 
in Tobin (1971, 2001). Tobin tax involves applying a small charge (0.1%) on foreign 
currency transactions to protect countries from exchange-rate volatility caused by 
short-term currency speculation in Pimlott (2009) and in Tobin (2001). The Tobin tax 
was supported by many leaders in Brown (2009) and in Giles (2009). Other proposed 
options to consider with the aim of encouraging of responsible banking may include in 
Pimlott (2009): 
1) Tobin tax a global financial transactions levy; 
2) Insurance fee to reflect systemic risk; 
3) Debt that swaps into equity when capital levels fall too low; 
4) Resolution fund, similar to a pre-funded bank bail-out fund, that lenders 
would pay into and could be used should an institution collapse. 
In our opinion, the Random Tax is better than the Tobin Tax, because it is a tax, 
which applies to the high-risk high-profit speculative transactions between the market 
agents only. The Random Tax may be imposed selectively, based on the generally 
accepted criteria and definitions of this type of transactions. 
The next macroeconomic problem is that the excessive liquidity in financial 
system may help to fight with the deflation in financial system in short term, but result 
in an increase of inflation expectations in long term. In the USA, the money became a 
commodity rather than a medium of exchange in time, when the US dollar enjoys a 
privilege status of global reserve currency. Foreign investors prefer to invest the earned 
US dollars in the US government bonds with 2%-3% interest rate guaranteed by the 
state. In near term perspective, the existing interest rates on the US government bonds 
may become smaller than the inflation expectations, caused by the US Quantitative 
Easing policies, soaring US trade deficit, collapsed US real estate market and US 
economic downturn. Main creditors of the USA: P.R. China, Japan and gulf countries, 
may prefer to diversify their monetary reserves with the aim to hedge against the 
weakening US dollar and systemic risks associated with the US financial system. 
Therefore, the wise exit strategy from the Quantitative Easing and control of inflation is 
a task number one for the US Federal Reserve and US Government. 
The growing trade deficit in the USA; big trade surplus in P.R. China; 
devaluation and fixation of Chinese currency at undervalued level lead to asymmetric 
capital flows between the financial markets. These global imbalances can be partly 
controlled with the help of multilateral currencies exchange rates agreement in 
Flassbeck (2009). 
The financial system has to be efficient. It means that the size of banks and 
structure of the national financial systems have to be changed. The small and medium 
size local banks are more efficient in serving the needs of small and medium size 
businesses, because their managerial systems as well as capital supply and distribution 
chains are more optimized for this purpose in Justin Yifu Lin (2009). The small banks 
can react promptly on the constantly changing local market conditions. Therefore, the 
capital intensive large inefficient banks and investment firms with high degree of 
bureaucracy have to be re-shaped in accordance with the new financial policies 
framework and specific needs of every country. However, the idea to break up the 
banks and investment firms with big capitalization has to be approached carefully, 
because the role of large systemic banks and investment firms in supply of capital for 
the transnational corporations or governmental housing/education loans national 
programs shouldn’t be underestimated. 
In addition, the new capital requirements and acceptable risk management 
practices have to be introduced and maintained by every bank. All the banks will need 
in Sachs (2009): 
1) To have the depositary reserve; 
2) To maintain the capital adequacy; 
3) To have the depositary insurance. 
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision has to develop the new 
international banking standards with revised: 
1) Bank capital rules; 
2) Leverage ratios rules; 
3) Liquidity rules. 
Five wise advices are given to financial authorities in Soros (2009): 
1) To accept responsibility for preventing bubbles from growing too big; 
2) To control the money supply; to control the availability of credit by setting 
the margin requirements and minimum capital requirements; 
3) To monitor the systemic risks; 
4) To recognize that financial markets evolve in a one-directional, non-
reversible manner, and extend an implicit guarantee to all financial institutions that are 
too big to fail; 
5) To raise the risk ratings of securities held by banks similar to the risk ratings 
of regular loans in the next Basel Accords. 
We are confident that the financial innovation will continue to generate the 
wealth in long term perspective. The creation of new financial clusters will enable this 
innovation, because the clusters will encourage competition among the banks in Porter 
(2008). 
 
We think that the global financial meltdown had a negative impact on the 
reputation of the international banking system. This paper has aimed to propose the 
conceptual intellectual framework on new banking regulation policies, which may be 
used by G20 policymakers to regain confidence in financial system through the 
creation of new financial architecture in a century of globalization. The G20 
policymakers and regulators may consider introducing the proposed changes into the 
global financial system, aligning it with principles of transparency and integrity with 
the aim to establish a truly competitive environment for sustainable accountable 
prosperous development of international banking system. This open environment will 
certainly facilitate the realization of competitive strategies toward the effective, 
profitable, responsible and sustainable bank operation with the focus on in Chaney, 
Goodhart, Webb (2009): 
1. Governance of banks; 
2. Fair valuation of assets; 
4. Optimization of risk management; 
5. Creation of effective compensation system. 
We believe that the US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, National 
Central Banks, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, Bank for International Settlements and Financial Services Authority 
will effectively collaborate together to establish the reputation of international financial 
system with introduction and adaptation of better financial regulation. We are confident 
that the globalization would work as in Wolf (2009), if the improved global governance 
policies, created due to our advanced mental understanding of universal balancing 
economic laws in Brochmann (1929, 1930, 1931), could better balance the global 
capital, commodity, equity and labor markets on the way to the financial stability and 
economic prosperity. 
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